In May 2014, a new quantum key distribution protocol named “Round Robin Differential-Phase-Shift Quantum Key Distribution (RR DPS QKD)” was proposed. It has a special feature that the key consumption via privacy amplification is a small constant because RR DPS QKD guarantees its security by information causality, not by information-disturbance trade-off. Therefore, the authors claimed that RR DPS QKD systems does not need to monitor the disturbance by an attacker in the quantum channel. However, this study shows that a modified Faked-State Attack (or so-called bright illumination attack) can hack a RR DPS QKD system almost perfectly if it is implemented with realistic detectors even information-causality guarantees the security of RR DPS QKD protocol. Therefore, this study also proposes a possible Measurement-Device-Independent RR DPS QKD system to avoid the modified Faked-State Attack.

Date Published: 7 May 2015
PDF: 9 pages
Proc. SPIE 9505, Quantum Optics and Quantum Information Transfer and Processing 2015, 950504 (7 May 2015); doi: 10.1117/12.2176770

Published in SPIE Proceedings Vol. 9505:
Quantum Optics and Quantum Information Transfer and Processing 2015
Konrad Banaszek; Christine Silberhorn, Editor(s)