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Proceedings Paper

Exploiting exploration strategies in repeated normal form security games
Author(s): James Thomas House; George Cybenko
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Paper Abstract

We describe a method for the estimation of an opponent's utility matrix in a finite repeated game, given that he selects his actions by a known deterministic algorithm with some unknown parameters. We also investigate the prediction, based on the utility matrix estimate, of this opponent's future actions, and a simple method by which the opponent can counter these efforts. These are posed as a feasibility problem and a convex optimization problem, respectively. Simulation results are also presented.

Paper Details

Date Published: 18 June 2012
PDF: 13 pages
Proc. SPIE 8359, Sensors, and Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) Technologies for Homeland Security and Homeland Defense XI, 835907 (18 June 2012); doi: 10.1117/12.924760
Show Author Affiliations
James Thomas House, Dartmouth College (United States)
George Cybenko, Dartmouth College (United States)


Published in SPIE Proceedings Vol. 8359:
Sensors, and Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) Technologies for Homeland Security and Homeland Defense XI
Edward M. Carapezza, Editor(s)

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