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Proceedings Paper

Binary forensic code for multimedia signals: resisting minority collusion attacks
Author(s): W. Sabrina Lin; Shan He; Jeffrey Bloom
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Paper Abstract

Digital forensic marking is a technology to discourage unauthorized redistribution of multimedia signals by embedding a unique mark into each user's copy of the content. A powerful class of attacks on forensic marking is the collusion attack by a group of users. Recently, a new collusion attack, called the minority attack, has been proposed against forensic marking schemes with correlation-based detectors. Although this attack is not very effective on Gaussian-based forensic marking, it is quite powerful on removing the traces of users when the forensic marking is binary. In this paper, we first study the performance of an ECC-based binary forensic code under the minority attack and we model the additional processing, such as compression, applied on colluded copy as a binary symmetric channel. We confirm that the system can be defeated by a minority attack from only 3 colluders. To resist the minority attack, we propose a row-permuted binary orthogonal code to serve as the inner code for ECC-based forensic code, coupled with an adaptive detector. Experimental results show that the proposed scheme has a significantly improved resistance to a minority attack.

Paper Details

Date Published: 4 February 2009
PDF: 11 pages
Proc. SPIE 7254, Media Forensics and Security, 725411 (4 February 2009); doi: 10.1117/12.816282
Show Author Affiliations
W. Sabrina Lin, Univ. of Maryland, College Park (United States)
Shan He, THOMSON Corporate Research (United States)
Jeffrey Bloom, THOMSON Corporate Research (United States)

Published in SPIE Proceedings Vol. 7254:
Media Forensics and Security
Edward J. Delp; Jana Dittmann; Nasir D. Memon; Ping Wah Wong, Editor(s)

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