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Proceedings Paper

Dynamic prisoner's dilemma on scale-free network
Author(s): Mao-Bin Hu; Yong-Hong Wu; Rui Jiang; Qing-Song Wu
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Paper Abstract

In this paper, we study the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) on a scale-free social network where the agents participate the game with a probability proportional to the power of their degree, i.e., Pi ~ kαi. In this way, the agents' participation in the game change with time, and our study reveals some properties of PDG in a dynamic social structure. In the generations each active player updates its strategy by following one of the active neighbors' strategy with a probability dependent on the payoff difference. Simulation shows the dynamic attending of agents has an important effect on the evolutionary game. In order to enhance cooperation behavior, we need to constrain participant of low-degree agents and encourage participant of high-degree agents in the game. In most cases, a maximum cooperation frequency is achieved when α is set to be slightly higher than zero. Our study may also shed some light on the policy construction of government.

Paper Details

Date Published: 5 January 2008
PDF: 6 pages
Proc. SPIE 6802, Complex Systems II, 680217 (5 January 2008); doi: 10.1117/12.769770
Show Author Affiliations
Mao-Bin Hu, Univ. of Science and Technology of China (China)
Curtin Univ. of Technology (Australia)
Yong-Hong Wu, Curtin Univ. of Technology (Australia)
Rui Jiang, Univ. of Science and Technology of China (China)
Qing-Song Wu, Univ. of Science and Technology of China (China)

Published in SPIE Proceedings Vol. 6802:
Complex Systems II
Derek Abbott; Tomaso Aste; Murray Batchelor; Robert Dewar; Tiziana Di Matteo; Tony Guttmann, Editor(s)

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