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Proceedings Paper

Effect of epidemic dynamics on evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game in scale-free networks
Author(s): Rui Jiang; Mao-Bin Hu; Qing-Song Wu
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Paper Abstract

This paper studies the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) in finite dynamic scale-free networks, where the dynamic property is fulfilled by considering an epidemic process in networks. When a person is in infected state, he will not play PDG. Only healthy persons play PDG with their healthy neighbors. Our simulations show that (i) the ratio of healthy persons, Rs, depends not only on the spreading rate λ, but also on the recovery rate δ; (ii) The relationship between cooperation behaviors and the spreading rate λ depends on the value of δ; (iii) Given the same value of Rs and payoff parameter b, the cooperation frequency f changes with δ; (iv) Some curves of f against Rs are monotonic while others are non-monotonic. We have qualitatively explained results (ii)-(iv) through competition mechanism of cooperation enhancement effect and cooperation suppression effect. Our work sheds some lights on the important effect of dynamic topology on evolutionary game.

Paper Details

Date Published: 5 January 2008
PDF: 7 pages
Proc. SPIE 6802, Complex Systems II, 680216 (5 January 2008); doi: 10.1117/12.768602
Show Author Affiliations
Rui Jiang, Univ. of Science and Technology of China (China)
Mao-Bin Hu, Univ. of Science and Technology of China (China)
Qing-Song Wu, Univ. of Science and Technology of China (China)

Published in SPIE Proceedings Vol. 6802:
Complex Systems II
Derek Abbott; Tomaso Aste; Murray Batchelor; Robert Dewar; Tiziana Di Matteo; Tony Guttmann, Editor(s)

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