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Proceedings Paper

A practical timing attack on RSA over a LAN
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Paper Abstract

Today, the specific implementation of a cryptosystem is of possibly greater importance than the underlying cryptographic algorithm itself. Through side-channel cryptanalysis, an adversary may deduce a secret key just by monitoring implementation-specific side channels, such as execution time or power consumption during a cryptographic operation. In this paper, we describe a successful remote timing attack against a server running a protocol similar to SSL. Using a fully-automated attack on Chinese Remaindering Theorem (CRT) implementations of RSA, we show it is practical to recover a 1024-bit key in under an hour over a local area network.

Paper Details

Date Published: 18 April 2006
PDF: 9 pages
Proc. SPIE 6241, Data Mining, Intrusion Detection, Information Assurance, and Data Networks Security 2006, 624111 (18 April 2006); doi: 10.1117/12.673492
Show Author Affiliations
Mark J. Lodato, Lafayette College (United States)
Ismail Jouny, Lafayette College (United States)


Published in SPIE Proceedings Vol. 6241:
Data Mining, Intrusion Detection, Information Assurance, and Data Networks Security 2006
Belur V. Dasarathy, Editor(s)

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