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Proceedings Paper

Analysis of the DCS.v2 authentication protocol
Author(s): Richard E. Newman; Lisa Dyson; Oswaldo Sabina
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Paper Abstract

Developers of the UF Distributed Conferencing System, version 2 have proposed a protocol that involves the distribution of a session key by a trusted server to a principal with whom it will communicate. The protocol differs form standard key exchange protocols in that it attempts to address the issue of the delivery of a private key as well as the desired session key in a secure fashion. Because of the complexity of asymmetric keys, it is necessary for human principals to sort either private keys until needed. The DCS v. 2 protocol assumes that principals encrypt their private keys and store them on a network. When they seek to communicate with other principals, they must request that the appropriate encrypted key be issued to them by the server which will in turn be used to decrypt the session key. This paper present the protocol and analysis is using BAN logic.

Paper Details

Date Published: 6 November 1998
PDF: 9 pages
Proc. SPIE 3456, Mathematics of Data/Image Coding, Compression, and Encryption, (6 November 1998); doi: 10.1117/12.330370
Show Author Affiliations
Richard E. Newman, Univ. of Florida (United States)
Lisa Dyson, Univ. of Florida (United States)
Oswaldo Sabina, Univ. of Florida (United States)


Published in SPIE Proceedings Vol. 3456:
Mathematics of Data/Image Coding, Compression, and Encryption
Mark S. Schmalz, Editor(s)

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