Share Email Print
cover

Proceedings Paper

Quantum cryptography with malicious devices
Author(s): Marcos Curty; Hoi-Kwong Lo
Format Member Price Non-Member Price
PDF $14.40 $18.00
cover GOOD NEWS! Your organization subscribes to the SPIE Digital Library. You may be able to download this paper for free. Check Access

Paper Abstract

The current paradigm for the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) relies on the legitimate users of the system trusting their devices, which include both the quantum communication components and the classical post-processing units. However, in view of the memory attacks recently proposed against device-independent QKD, as well as the many hardware and software Trojan Horse attacks that threaten the security of conventional cryptography today, such trust is a very strong and unjustified assumption. Here we review a recent proposal to solve this problem based on the use of verifiable secret sharing and redundancies. We show that this approach can deliver secret key rates which are comparable to those obtained in an ideal scenario with honest devices.

Paper Details

Date Published: 8 October 2018
PDF: 13 pages
Proc. SPIE 10803, Quantum Information Science and Technology IV, 1080303 (8 October 2018); doi: 10.1117/12.2502066
Show Author Affiliations
Marcos Curty, Univ. de Vigo (Spain)
Hoi-Kwong Lo, Univ. of Toronto (Canada)


Published in SPIE Proceedings Vol. 10803:
Quantum Information Science and Technology IV
Mark T. Gruneisen; Miloslav Dusek; John G. Rarity, Editor(s)

© SPIE. Terms of Use
Back to Top