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Proceedings Paper

Stable structures of coalitions in competitive and altruistic military teams
Author(s): M. Aurangzeb; D. Mikulski; G. Hudas; F. L. Lewis; Edward Gu
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Paper Abstract

In heterogeneous battlefield teams, the balance between team and individual objectives forms the basis for the internal topological structure of teams. The stability of team structure is studied by presenting a graphical coalitional game (GCG) with Positional Advantage (PA). PA is Shapley value strengthened by the Axioms of value. The notion of team and individual objectives is studied by defining altruistic and competitive contribution made by an individual; altruistic and competitive contributions made by an agent are components of its total or marginal contribution. Moreover, the paper examines dynamic team effects by defining three online sequential decision games based on marginal, competitive and altruistic contributions of the individuals towards team. The stable graphs under these sequential decision games are studied and found to be structurally connected, complete, or tree respectively.

Paper Details

Date Published: 17 May 2013
PDF: 12 pages
Proc. SPIE 8741, Unmanned Systems Technology XV, 87410L (17 May 2013); doi: 10.1117/12.2014391
Show Author Affiliations
M. Aurangzeb, The Univ. of Texas at Arlington (United States)
D. Mikulski, U.S. Army Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Ctr. (United States)
G. Hudas, U.S. Army Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Ctr. (United States)
F. L. Lewis, The Univ. of Texas at Arlington (United States)
Edward Gu, Oakland Univ. (United States)


Published in SPIE Proceedings Vol. 8741:
Unmanned Systems Technology XV
Robert E. Karlsen; Douglas W. Gage; Charles M. Shoemaker; Grant R. Gerhart, Editor(s)

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